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CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION'
By

ERNST FREUND.'

I.
If at the beginning of the year 1911 the constitutional status of
workmen's compensation was one of uncertainty, at the end of the

year it could hardly be characterized otherwise than as one of
confusion.

On March 24, 1911, the Court of Appeals of New York declared the carefully framed and conservative compensation act of that
state unconstitutional, and by an unanimous decision condemned the
very principle of the legislation, not as intrinsically objectionable,
but as contrary to the positive limitations embodied in the guaranty
of due process. 3 The Supreme Court of the state of Washington,
on the other hand, on September 27, 1911, in sustaining a compulsory insurance law, strongly endorsed a theory of the police power
which would also support compulsory compensation, and the decision
must therefore, be regarded as opposed to that of New York.4 The
principle of compulsory insurance was likewise sustained by a decision of the Supreme Court of Montana, although the act of that
state was declared invalid as arbitrarily discriminating between employer and employee, giving the latter an election between his common law right of action and the compensation under the act, while
the employer is required to pay the insurance assessment at all
events. *1 So-called elective laws (of which more later on) were upheld by an opinion of the justices of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, 5 and by decision of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin.6
These two courts carefully abstained from committing themselves
with regard to the problem of compulsory compensation, but the
language used by the court of Wisconsin is unmistakably friendly
to it. Under the influence of the New York decision, the compensai. An address delivered before the American Association for Labor
Legislation in Washington, December 28, 1911.
2. Professor of Law in the University of Chicago.
3. Ives v. South Buffalo R. R. Co., 2Ol N. Y. 271, 94 N. E. 435.
4. State v. Clausen, - Wash. -, 117 Pac. iloi.
4Y2. Cunningham v. Northwestern Improvement Co., - Mont. -, 119
Pac. 554, November 21, 1911.
3o8, July 24, 1911.
5. Opinion of Justices,- Mass. -, 96 N.
6. Borgreis v. The Falk Company, - Wis. -, 133 N. W. 2o9, Nov.
14. 1911.

HeinOnline -- 6 Ill. L. R. 432 1911-1912

STATUS OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

dion laws of California, Illinois, Kansas, New Hampshire, New Jersey
and Ohio 6%(the latter an insurance law) were likewise made elecive.
The federal commission on employers' liability and workmen's
compensation, however, has prepared a bill framed upon the principle
of compulsory compensation which the New York Court of Appeals
rejected. The action of the federal commission in repudiating the
conclusion reached in New York is significant, and it is merely
another evidence of the fact which must have impressed itself upon
all observers, namely, that the New York decision is not generally
accepted as finally settling the question. The expressions of dissent
and criticism have been numerous and strong, and since the New
York decision is not binding in other states, or on the federal courts,
it is well to restate the reasons upon which is based the hope that
the decision will, in course of time, yield to views which are sounder
legally, as well as socially more satisfactory' In criticizing the decision of the Court of Appeals of New York, it must be borne in
mind that the New York law was limited to the trade risks of hazardous industries. Somewhat different considerations are presented by
compensation laws not so limited, by compensation laws operating
through insurance, and by optional or elective compensation laws.
Ii.
The main arguments against the soundness of the law laid down
in the Ives case are, that the analogies of principles previously sustained logically demand a different conclusion, and that the view
taken of the guaranty of due process is unduly narrow.
i. The validity of the liability created by the law of New
York is supported by the analogy of other statutes which have been
sustained. The analogies most strongly relied upon before the Court
of Appeals of New York as supporting the validity of the law were:
first, the liability of railroad companies for damage done by fire
caused by sparks escaping from locomotives; second, the liability of
railroad companies for 'injuries to passengers under the law of
Nebraska; and, third, the liability to injured seamen under the
maritime law. The liability of railroad companies for fire had been
sustained by the Supreme Court of the United States as a liability
imposed irrespective of fault.7

The New York Court of Appeals

6Y2. The Ohio law has likewise been sustained since the above was
written.
7. St. L. & S. F. R. Co. v. Mathews, 165 U. S. x.

HeinOnline -- 6 Ill. L. R. 433 1911-1912

6 ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

gives a number of reasons why this analogy should not be accepted
as controlling. It urges that the constitution of Missouri (the case
having arisen under a statute of that state) contains a clause to the
Effect that the exercise of the police power shall never be abridged
or so construed as to permit corporations to conduct their business in
such a manner as to infringe the equal rights of individuals or the
general well-being of the state. Will anyone seriously deny that the
same principle, whether expressed or not, must exist in every state,
or contend that it can be relied upon to modify the guaranty of due
process? Must not the principle of due process always and everywhere be interpreted in subordination to the principle thus expressed in the constitution of Missouri? The Court of Appeals
further quotes from a. federal court to the effect that
"the right to use the agencies of fire and steam in the movement of trains
is derived from the legislation of the state and it certainly cannot be denied
that it is for the state to determine what safeguards must be used to
prevent the escape of fire and to define the extent of the liability of fires resulting from the operation of trains by means of steam locomotives."

Why, it must be asked, is this proposition not applicable quite
as well to the protection of employees as it is to the protection of
adjoining landowners? The Court of Appeals leaves us without
answer. And finally the Court of Appeals says:
"These statutes are designed to protect the rights of those who have no
contractual relations to the corporations which inflict the injury. In such
a case, when both parties are equally faultless, the legislature may properly
consider it to be just that the duty of insuring private property against
loss or injury caused by the use of dangerous instruments should rest
upon the railroad company which employs the instruments and creates the
peril for its own profit, rather than upon the owners of the property, who
have no control over or interest in these instruments."
Why cannot the legislature give force to the same considerations
in favor of the employee? Surely the whole trend of modem social
thought is opposed to the distinction made by the New York court.
The Court of Appeals also rejects the analogy of the Nebraska law,
sustained by the federal supreme court, which made railroad companies absolutely liable for injuries to passengers, excepting injuries due to the violation of some express rule of the company
actually brought to the notice of the passenger. This principle of
liability is almost identical with the one of the New York act.
The New York court says that the point decided in that case was
that this rule of liability was a part of the very statute under which
the corporation took its charter. It is true that the Supreme Court,
in the closing paragraph of the opinion, states that this is sufficient
to sustain the statute, but it is also true that the much greater portion
of the opinion is devoted to a justification of the rule upon principle,
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and unless the Supreme Court repudiates the arguments used in this
case it would seem to stand committed to the principle of absolute
liability, at least for railroad companies.8
2.
The liability of the New York act was further analogous to
the liability of the ship for the expense of caring for and curing a
mariner who is injured in the service of the ship, a principle recognized by the maritime law of all nations, including England and
America. The Court of Appeals speaks of peculiar rights and privileges, wisely and benevolently built up by the maritime law for the
protection of the seamen, which are not cognizable in the common
law. As a matter of fact, these rights are cognizable in the common
law, for a common law court, as well as a court of admiralty, will enforce these principles." Furthermore, this liability was neither confined to exceptional circumstances of an injury happening during a
sea voyage, nor to an injury due to the perils of the sea, for it was
enforced in favor of an engineer working on the ship while in port,
exactly as any other engineer might be working at the same kind of
occupation on shore.'1 It is true that the liability of the ship extended
only to the expense of the care of the disabled seaman, who was not
entitled to indemnity for permanfent loss of earning capacity. But is it
possible that the principle of due process is consistent with indemnification up to a certain point, while it forbids an indemnity calculated
upon a more liberal basis? The essential point is that the expense
arising out of an injury for which the ship owner is in nowise to
blame and which may even be due to the fault and negligence of the
injured seaman, is charged against the ship, thus clearly recognizing
a liability without fault. Whether that liability is restricted to the
expense of curing or is extended to the care of the permanently disabled person, after his actual sickness is over, cannot be the difference
between due process and lack of due process. The Court of Appeals
says that the maritime law is exceptional in its character. It should,
however, be borne in mind that in the older law the occupation of
the mariner was the one occupation conspicuous for hazards, at a
time when great mechanical forces were not ordinarily employed in
industries.
3. The liability of the employer irrespective of his fault is
finally analogous to the general principle of the liability of the master for the acts of his servant. It is not always recognized that
SC. R.I. & P. R. Co. v. Zernecke, 183 U. S. 582.
See Scarff v. Metcalf, 1o7 N. Y. 211, and Holt v. Cummings, i02

9.

Pa.

212.

io. Holt v. Cummings, lo2 Pa. St. 212.

HeinOnline -- 6 Ill. L. R. 435 1911-1912

6 ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

the principle respondeat superior is a principle of liability without
fault. The civil law makes the matter liable only for lack of proper
care in selection or supervision; the common law, in making him
absolutely liable toward others than servants for the fault of a
servant, departs from the strict and normal rule of justice based
on moral fault and responsibility. The abrogation of the fellowservant doctrine further extends this principle of expediency. Where
the employer has used all possible care! in selecting and supervising
his servant, the negligence of the servant resulting in injury to
another servant is, as far as that employer is concerned, as much an
accident as any other accident resulting from imperfections in his
machinery or plant which the employer can by no possible care
avoid. There is therefore no controlling difference in constitutional
principle between the abrogation of the fellow-servant doctrine and
the liability of the employer for an accident which is due to a risk
inherent to the trade. As Senator Sutherland, the chairman of the
Federal Employers' Liability Commission, tersely puts it, in the
one case the master is held responsible for the fault of the dangerous
1
Conagent and in the other for the fault of the dangerous agency.
ceding, as the Court of Appeals does, that the legislature may abrogate the defenses both of common employment and of ordinary contributory negligence, it is inconsistent to hold that the legislature
cannot create the liability which was proposed to be created by the
New York act.
4. The liability for trade risks and due process of law:
If we assume, for the sake of argument, that our law has had
in the past no analogies to workmen's compensation, and that the
new legislation embodies an entirely novel principle, that principle
should not for that reason alone be repudiated as being contrary to
due process. Three rules may well be laid down for the application
of the guaranty of due process, by which the New York decision may
be tested:
(i) In establishing new canons of justice, the legislature is
neither bound by every historical limitation of the common law, nor
is it free to advance so far beyond prevailing ideas as to make the
law utopian or even socialistic or communistic; in other-words, the
law may be in its reasonableness, progressive; and it must be in its
progressiveness, reasonable.
The standard of reasonableness must be approved by the
(2)
courts.
ii.

Briefs, p. 159.
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(3) The standard of reasonableness should be the same forthe
state and the nation.
Applying these rules to the relation between employer and em
ploye, it must be insisted that the law may go beyond the elemental
grounds of liability-viz., consent and fault-and advance to a new
basis, which may be properly designated as that of social solidarity.
Of course, if the first portion of the argument here presented -is
sound, the basis is not new at all; but assuming it to be new, its
recognition imposes itself upon our law by the force of prevailing 4ndustrial conditions. That social solidarity is not one to be conjured
up at the will of the legislature, but must be founded in the nature of
relations and in our social consciousness. To illustrate: The Court
of Appeals asks whether my neighbor can be made to pay my debts?
Certainly not; for the basis of social solidarity is lacking. Nor
would there be such solidarity between landlord and tenant under
modern conditions. Were the law to make the employer liable for
the loss falling on an employe through disease contracted, outside
of the employment, it would probably have to be judged, not as a
rule of liability, but as a radical legislative change of the relation
of employment and of its economic terms. But where the employer
is made liable to a partial compensation for losses due to the risks
of a hazardous industry, which are either actually or humanly
speaking, inevitable, the solidarity is obvious and undeniable, and
had it been recognized by the unwritten law, its abrogation might
well be condemned as arbitrary and unreasonable.
The imposition of such a liability does not simply alter the
economic terms of the contract of employment. Such a view may
to a certain extent be justified if the employer is required to indemnify in part his employe for the losses due to ordinary sickness,
or old age, or unemployment. In the case of compensation laws, the
loss for which indemnity is paid is the result of an undertaking
carried on by the master for his own benefit. Those laws simply fix
the consequences of conditions inherent in the transaction and practically beyond the control of either party. Viewed in this light,
the compensation laws bear no analogy to those laws which have
been condemned as interfering with the essentials of econormic
liberty whereby parties are free to agree upon the terms of buying
and selling labor, assuming for the sake of argument that Ow.t
liberty cannot be impaired.'" The substitution of a compensation o*n
a fixed basis for damages estimated from case to case is justifiable
12.

Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45; Adair v. U. S., 2o8 U. S. :261.
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because it means a practical approximation toward justice in preference to a theoretically perfect justice adapted to each individual
case, which, in the practical administration of justice, has proved to
be arbitrary, speculative and grossly unequal guesswork. It seems
to have the sanction of the Supreme Court of the United States,
in the decision supporting the front foot rule of special benefit
assessments.13
When it is laid down as a second requirement of due process,
that the standard of reasonableness must be approved by the courts,
recognition is not merely given to the established operation of our
constitutional law, but also to the principle that the standard of reasonableness must commend itself to the conservative sense of the
community which the judiciary represents more faithfully than the
legislature. While the test of judicial approval is not infallible, it
is the most practicable which we have, and under our institutions
a condition in which the judiciary is seriously out of harmony with
the deliberate and sustained will of the community can only be
temporary, and had much better be overcome by seeking to bring
about a change in judicial opinion than by overturning it by popular
verdict. Negatively expressed, this same requirement means that
the definition and evolution of due process should be a matter of
judicial interpretation, and not of popular decision by referendum
from case to case.
And this also follows from the third proposition that the standard of reasonableness must be the same for state and nation; for
a state referendum cannot affect the Fourteenth Amendment, and a
national referendum is impracticable.
It is at this point that issue must be taken most emphatically
with the Court of Appeals of New York. In referring to the demand for a change in the law, it says:
"We have already admitted the strength of this appeal to a recognized
and widely prevalent sentiment; but we think it is an appeal which must be
made to the people and not to the courts."

Apparently, the court places upon the due process clause of the
state constitution a construction by which it is made to embody
the limitations of a historical state policy not identical with, but
narrower than, the limitations imposed by the national constitution,
with the result that state due process becomes a purely conventional
principle, which time may show to be inadequate to satisfy the
demands of a more perfect justice and which is therefore susceptible
of improvement to be brought about by constitutional amendment
y5

Parsonsv. District of Columbia, 17o U. S.45.
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The method of a specific constitutional amendment to sanction
workmen's compensation encounters the difficulty of finding a
proper formula of grant of power; either it is sufficiently wide to
cover future needs and developments, in which case the submission
to popular vote must reckon with the natural apprehension of the
voter that his favorable vote may be construed as giving sanction to
projects which he does not for the present approve, or the formula
is adapted to the particular exigency, in which case doubt is thrown
at once upon all legislation not coming within its terms. The dilemma
is inevitable, and demonstrates that this method of dealing with the
difficulty will fundamentally alter the theory of our state constitutions, transforming them from charters of limitations into miscellaneous collections of enabling acts. Whatever, therefore, may be
thought expedient in view of the particular exigencies of the New
York situation, as a general principle the method of adopting a
narrow construction of due process and then allowing it to be overridden by constitutional amendment cannot be commended as either
desirable or as right in principle.
If it were possible to use the power over corporations to enact
a compensation law applicable to businesses conducted under corporate organization, this might furnish a solution of the problem
with which the people of New York are confronted; for not only
are nearly all, if not all, the industries affected by the New York
law under corporate control, but the discrimination between corporate and individual employers as regards liability toward employees
ought, in the absence of an adverse decision by the Supreme Court
of the United States, to have a good chance of being sustained by
the courts, but the suggestion made by Chief Judge Cullen in his
concurring opinion, that a compensation law might be confined to
corporations to be created hereafter, or that revocable charters of
existing corporations might be revoked and reorganization be permitted only upon condition of accepting the law, is impracticable.
III.

Elective or optional laws. Outside of the state of New York
the constitutional difficulty was sought to be met in another way.
The New York decision having been the first one to come from a
court of last resort upon this phase of constitutional law, and having
been rendered by an unanimous court and one of the highest standing in the country, it was felt in other states where compensation
bills were pending at the time, that it would be unwise to press
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measures based upon the principle thus rejected, and all these states,
except Washington, made their laws at least nominally optional or
elective.
The experience of Massachusetts, where a law of 19o7, allowing the substitution by agreement of a compensation scheme for
common law rights and liabilities, had remained a dead letter, made
it likely that a purely optional measure would be of little practical
effect. The'new laws seek to avoid failure in this respect by encouraging election in various ways. So they all establish presumptions
in favor of election, to be overcome only by express notices of
dissent or non-acceptance, generally for both employers and employes, but in California and under the insurance systems only for
employes. If the law goes no further than creating presumptions,
there can, perhaps, be no objection, constitutional or otherwise. A
simple presumption, however, was considered inadequate. A further
pressure was sought to be exercised upon the employer by taking
from him the well-known common law defenses of assumption of
risk and fault of fellow servant (in Wisconsin, only where there are
at least four employes), and either abrogating or in various ways
qualifying the absolute bar of contributory negligence. The power
of the legislature to abrogate these defenses is generally conceded,
and where, as in California and New Jersey, the abrogation is unqualified, the motives of the legislature are beyond judicial control.
However, in order to exercise a similar pressure upon the employee,
the abrogation is generally qualified by providing that, whereas if the
employer shall elect not to accept the provisions of the law, he
shall lose the defenses, he retains them if, after he has accepted, the
employee, refusing to concur, sues at common law. This doubleedged coercion is found in Illinois, Kansas, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, Ohio and Wisconsin.
It is most undisguised in the act of Kansas, in which section 46
provides for actions to recover damages brought by an employee entitled to come within the provisions of the act against an employer
who might come, but has elected not to come within its provisions,
that the three defenses (assumption of risk, fault of fellow servant,
contributory negligence as absolute barr) shall not be available to
the defendant employer; while under section 47, in an action to recover damages brought by an employee who would be entitled
to come within the provisions of the act, against an employer who
has elected to come within its provisions, the employer (unless he
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or a managing agent was wilfully or grossly negligent) shall retain
these defenses unimpaired.
Wisconsin accomplishes the same result by first abrogating two
of the three defenses and then providing that any employer who has
elected to pay compensation shall not be subject to the provisions of
the abrogating section; for this likewise visits the failure to elect with
the penalty of the more unfavorable position in the common law action, since the workman who insists upon suing for damages instead of electing compensation obviously remains subject to the
defenses. The act in terms speaks only of the relief to the employer from a new burdensome provision, and leaves it to be inferred that the benefit to the employe which results from the burden
laid on the employer is taken from him, if he does not elect to take
compensation. Massachusetts even goes to the length of depriving
employees who sue at law of the benefits of the earlier employers'
liability acts of that state,"4 acts which were intended to remedy a
cofidition of the law grossly unjust to the employee.
If this novel method of forcing acceptance of a so-called optional measure is analyzed, it will appear to amount to this: that
the legislature proposes to have justice administered to two parties
to the same relation upon different terms, offering to each conditions
unfavorable to him and giving him the chance of redeeming himself
by declaring his willingness to accept the new method of relief.
Either the legislature has the power to compel compensation-can it
then exercise this compulsion in the roundabout way of denying justice except upon terms not applied to all alike?-or it has no such
power; can it then do by indirection what it cannot do directly?
This serious question goes to the very root of the laws of Illinois,
Kansas, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Ohio and Wisconsin. In
New Hampshire the difficulty is aggravated by the fact that the
employer, before he can elect to come under the act, must establish
his solvency by filing a bond conditioned upon the discharge of his
liabilities.
With the single exception of New Jersey, all the states also
treat employer and employe unequally in the matter of exercising
the option. In Kansas and Ohio the employe can escape the operation of the act only by leaving the employment; the" same is true
in New Hampshire, where the law is silent as to his right of election;
while in California, Illinois, Massachusetts and Wisconsin the workman may refuse compensation once, but having once accepted remains
14.

Last codified in i9og.
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bound, whereas the employer is at liberty to withdraw every year.
The acts apparently assume that it is superfluous to safeguard the
rights of the employee since the employer can in any event force
acceptance of his terms by dismissing the recalcitrant employe. Thus,
there seems to be a discrimination against the employee in the matter
of election, which adds to the other difficulties of the elective scheme.
It is believed that either under specific clauses under our constitutions guaranteeing to each person the right to have his remedy
in court freely and without purchase, or under the general principle
of the equal protection of the law, justice must be administered upon
equal terms to all irrespective of collateral considerations and not
with a view to driving people into a legislative policy which it is
feared may be unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin attempts to dispose of this
difficulty as follows:
"But it is said that there is no proper classification here, and hence
that the law is fatally discriminating in its character. The two defenses
are preserved intact to employers who elect to come under the law, and
taken away from those who do not so elect. The rules governing classification are familiar and are, in brief, as follows: it must be based on
substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to
the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only,
and must apply equally to each number of the class. It seems to us that
this classification fully meets these requirements; certainly there will be
very real differences between the situation of the employer who elects
to come under the law and the emoloyer who does not. If the consenting
employer only employs workmen who also elect to come under the law,
he can never be mulcted in heavy damages and will know whenever an
employe is injured, practically just what must be paid for the injury;
surely this is a different situation from the situation of the man who is
liable to be brought into court by an injured employe at any time and

obliged to defend common law actions upon heavy claims, unliquidated in
their character, the outcome of which actions none can foretell. On the
other hand if, as seems quite likely, the greater part of the consenting
employer's workmen consent, but some do not, and these latter are still
retained in the employment, the same considerations will apply, with somewhat less force. On the one hand there is a class of consenting employers
employing wholly or largely consenting workmen, and having definite
and fixed obligations to their workmen in case of injury; on the other hand
is a class of non-consenting employers, who have no such fixed obligations
in case of injury to their workmen, but choose to meet every such workman in court and fight out the question of liability. There seems a very
robust difference between these two classes. But after all, there is another
distinction which seems perhaps more satisfactory: the consenting employer
has done his share, and it must be considered a considerable share, in
rendering successful the legislative attempt to meet and solve a difficult
social and economic problem. Even if it be true (which, as before stated,
is not decided) that he may not be compelled under our constitutions, state
and national, to assist in the solution of this problem, still does not his
voluntary act in giving that assistance constitute a substantial distinction,
making a real difference of situation between him and the employer who
refuses his aid, a difference which iustifies a difference in treatment?""
15.

Borgnis v. The Falk Company, -

Wis. -,

133 N. W. 209, 217.
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This argument certainly does not carry conviction, if the legislative attempt to meet and solve a difficult social and economic
problem involves an unconstitutional burden; for shorn of all verbiage it amounts to saying that a person may be penalized for standing upon his constitutional rights. As was recently said by the
Supreme Court of Ohio:
"We are not disposed to question, at least for our present purpose we
will not, that a citizen may waive a constitutional right, but we do deny
that he can be compelled, to waive his right, or that he can be arbitrarily
subjected to an option to stand upon one right under penalty of losing
another."1

If, on the other hand, the legislative policy is such that under
the constitution it would be possible to carry it out directly, the objection remains that the method chosen for indirect coercion involves
an unprecedented bartering of the terms of administering justice.
And this objection remains, even though the method should be declared, as in Wisconsin it has been declared, to be constitutional.
It is conceded to be a piece of legislative trickery; it must confuse
the common sense of right and wrong, and it makes a mischievous
precedent, which in time to come will give trouble to those who
invented it. Why should not the legislature indirectly force arbitration regarding wages by juggling the rights and remedies relating
to the various incidents of strikes, depriving as far as it can be
done, non-consenting employers of their right to injunction, and making picketing on the part of non-consenting employees a penal
offense? The classification would be that sanctioned by the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin.
It is a further undesirable consequence of this system of socalled election, that under the plea of voluntary acceptance, the
burden imposed upon the employer may be carried far beyond what
would be regarded as constitutionally safe in case of direct legislation. Thus it happened that the courts of Wisconsin and Massachusetts considered themselves absolved from the duty of passing
upon the merits of accident liability not confined to the trade risks
of a hazardous indutsry. On the theory of election there is no
reason why the legislature should not leave the final adjudication of
compensation claims to a political board.
It will also be interesting to watch how the problem of necessary
amendments will be handled in case of laws which rest in theory
upon voluntary adoption.
I6. Byers v. Meridian Printing Company, 95 N.

.

gi7, gig.
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"

IV.

It remains to say something upon the constitutional aspects of

workmen's compensation that have not been, covered by the foregoing
observations.
And, first, as to liability for accidents arising out of and in
course of the employment in any industry, though not specially hazardous, or not due to such hazard.
The arguments advanced in favor of the liability which the
New York act proposes to create, lose -some of their convincing
f6irce if the restriction to hazardous industries and to risks inherent
in the- trade is abandoned. In giving, the benefit of compensation
to all employees and extending it to injuries that have nothing to do
with the nature of the particular employment, the law practically
makes every contract of employment a partnership in the ordinary
risks of any occupation, and not only those risks which are inevitable, but also those which.are due to the carelessness of the employe.
That is to say, the employer is made to share the risks of the employe, not vice versa. Where the employer operates on a large scale,
it is the expediency rather than the justice of the principle of liability
which impresses the mind; where the employer has only very few
employees, and is not greatly superior to them in the social or economic scale, it is rather the injustice which is obvious. The exemption of domestic servants and farm employees seems to be based
upon the recognition of the injustice of such a liability, but in reality
ehiphasizes it by discriminating against other small employers and
raises a question under the equal protection clause of the federal
constitution.17 The English compensation act is free from this disctimination.
'The strongest argument in favor of the constitutionality, of a
liability not based upon special hazards is that it is after all no more
objectionable than the rule of respondeat superior applied in the
same way, which yet has never been challenged, or than the abro&tion in toto of the fellow servant doctrine, or of the doctrine of
=isiumption of risk or of contributory negligence, without regard
to3the nature of the employment, which seems to be conceded to
be valid.
If the law applies to hazardous industries only, but is not con17. The Supreme Court of Massachusetts holds, in the opinion rendered by the justices on the compensation bill, that the discrimination is
not fatal, so far as the abrogation of the common law defenses is concerned.
The law of Wisconsin exempts all employers of less than four employees
from the abrogation of the fellow servant doctrine.
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fined to accidents due to trade risks, but extends to any accident
arising out of or in the course of employment, the constitutional aspect is, in one respect, similar to that of a law applying to nonhazardous industries. Such is the law of Washington, and the bill
proposed by the Federal Compensation Commission. The Supreme
Court of Washington has left the question of validity, in view of
possible discrimination against other employers in the state (a
point which would not arise under a federal law, since the federal
jurisdiction does not extend to non-hazardous industries), undetermined. It must, however, be borne in mind that the constitution
does not require "aminute consideration of the distinction which may
arise from accidental circumstances as to the persons and things
coming within the general class provided for," and that "there cannot be an exact exclusion or inclusion of persons and things."is
It is particularly important that some freedom should be conceded
to the power of classification where the facility of administering a
law is a controlling consideration, and it is clear that the elimination
of the question of what constitutes a trade risk will remove a prolific
source of litigation' I

Compensation through insurance. The constitutional aspect of
insurance is somewhat different from that of simple compensation.
The difference may be stated by saying that in addition to dividing
the loss resulting from industrial accident between employer and
employee, insurance further distributes the share of the employer
among all employers, or among all employers of the same class.
Compulsory insurance may be looked upon either as an exercise of
the police power, requiring a number of employers to join in a
common plan for protecting their employees, or as an exercise of the
taxing power, levying contributions from the members of a class
for the purpose of relieving distress resulting from their occupation,
and distributing those contributions among the sufferers.
If compulsory compensation is held valid, it may be well urged
that compulsory insurance should be likewise held valid, upon the
theory that the power to impose a duty carries with it the power to
compel the adoption of appropriate and reasonable arrangements,
i8. L. & V.R. R. Co. v.Melton, 218 U. S. 36.
i8Y2. Much will depend upon the interpretation placed upon the words,
"arising out of and in'the course of the employment." The doubts regarding the justice of the liability, which have been suggested, will be practically
removed, if the courts in applying the act require that the injury must be due
to some risk peculiarly incident to the employment. Such seems to be the
tendency of some recent English decisions. See Anrys v. Barton [1912],
i K. B. 40, where a driver of a threshing engine was stung by a wasp and
died of blood poisoning; it was held that he was not entitled to compensation under the act.
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which alone can ensure the prompt and regular discharge of the'duty.
It is perfectly well known that compensation without insurance
would either be practically inoperative or work injustice, hardship
or ruin in many individual cases. The whole matter of liability
for accident-whether common law or statutory, whether based on
fault or not---can never be satisfactorily dealt with on a purely individualistic basis, since the possible consequences of an act may be
entirely disproportionate to the 'relation entered into by the parties
or to any fault of theirs; the only adequate solution of the problem,
as has been recognized in Germany, lies in the social principle of
insurance.
Theoretically, insurance is less just to the employer than liability
to compensation, since it makes him amenable to losses which he has
been not only careful to avoid, but successful in avoiding; and
a strong argument has been made against the practical operation
of state insurance, as compared with the co-operative insurance
of Germany. 19
As a measure of taxation compulsory insurance encounters difficulties in many states from specific constitutional limitations upon
the exercise of the taxing power. The Supreme Court of Washington
was of the opinion that the tax of that state might be sustained as a
license tax.
Considered as an exercise of the taxing power, compulsory insurance against the consequences of industrial accident may even
be held to fall within the power of federal legislation.2 0° In
connection with a federal law, however, the question would arise at
once: How could such a law protect the employer against common
law action by the injured employe in the state courts? Not only
is such a right of action entirely beyond the control of Congress,
but under a number of state constitutions it is also beyond the power
of the state legislature to abolish it. It is true that the payment of
federal insurance might be made dependent upon the execution of
a release of all rights of action under state' law; but there would
be nothing to prevent a state from declaring such a release to be
inoperative and Congress would be powerless against such legislation.
The mere possibility or probability of voluntary co-operation on the
part of the states would not be a sufficient answer to the objections
drawn from the inadequacy of federal power. there is no immediate prospect that this question will become practical.
'9. See the brief of Mr. W. T. Sherman, submitted to the Federal
Employers' Liability Commission, pp. 590-609.
20.
See the brief of Mr. Miles M. Dawson in The Survey of August
5. '9"1.
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